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Derksen, Hanneke, The Role of Tony Blair's Belief System in Great Britain's Decision to Support the War in Iraq M.A., Department of Political Science, May, 2007.

Great Britain's decision to go to war in Iraq in 2003, supporting America's Iraq policy, was a controversial one. This study looks at different explanations as to why Great Britain supported the U.S. ranging from those focusing on the historical ties between Great Britain and the U.S. and the role of Tony Blair himself. This study finds strong evidence supporting the point that leaders do matter in the making of policy, and Tony Blair and the Iraq War is an excellent example. To explain Blair's policies this study focuses on the role of Tony Blair's belief system, using the program Profiler Plus to create his Operational Code. When studying the formation of foreign policy and all the different factors that influence it, a leader and his belief system are a small, but important part of the puzzle.

THE ROLE OF TONY BLAIR'S BELIEF SYSTEM IN GREAT BRITAIN'S
DECISION TO SUPPORT THE WAR IN IRAQ

By
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A thesis submitted to the Department of Political Science
and The Graduate School of the University of Wyoming
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF SCIENCE
in
POLITICAL SCIENCE

Laramie, Wyoming
May, 2007

UMI Number: 1443290

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INTRODUCTION

Great Britain's decision to go to war in Iraq in 2003, thus supporting America's Iraq policy, was a controversial one which now, more than four years after the start of the war, is still hotly debated. Currently the Iraq War is fraught with difficulties with many American and British casualties, a civil war, and victory is far from sight. The Iraq War which was never very popular in Britain and has been fraught with difficulties: there are many American and British casualties, the situation has been called a civil war, and no victory is in sight. In this context the decision to go to war and to remain committed to the war has been full of political risks for Prime Minister Tony Blair. Given this context, why did Great Britain and Prime Minister Tony Blair specifically, support the U.S. and go to war? Why did the British Prime Minister put his personal prestige on the line, engaging in shuttle diplomacy attempting to convince the leaders of many countries to support the Iraq War? To what extent was Blair's support of an often perceived unilateral action against another sovereign state a break with his track-record in favor of multilateralism and diplomacy? This project uses these questions as a starting point to look into Tony Blair's decision to support the Iraq War.

The possible explanations as to why Great Britain supported the U.S. in its preparation and implementation of the War in Iraq range from those focusing on the historical ties between Britain and the United States to the role of Tony Blair himself. Those focusing the special nature of the transatlantic relationship (see Coates and Krieger, 2004 Dumbrell, 2004; Harris, 2002, Kimball, 2005a/b; Élie, 2005) argue that historical and cultural ties explain why Great Britain follows the U.S. lead in important

policies. To understand the relevance of the historical relationship between the U.S. and Great Britain this project does explore this relationship and analyzes the degree to which it can be considered a necessary and sufficient condition for explaining Great Britain's support for America's Iraq policy.

However, an exclusive focus on historic structures and patterns of the relationship implies that the individual leaders of those countries do not matter when it comes to foreign policymaking. We know from books written about Tony Blair and British policy that he was centrally involved (Marsh, 2003; Gardner, 2005; Dumbrell 2004; Coates and Krieger, 2004). Further we know from the general literature on leadership that under the right conditions (i.e. the context and the leader's personality) leaders and their beliefs *do* matter (George, 1979; Hagan, 2001; M. Hermann, 1988, 2001; M. Hermann, and C. Hermann, 1989; Holsti, 1976). Just as President George Bush has been the poster child of the Iraq War in the United States, so has Tony Blair been so in Britain. Observers of the months leading up to the invasion of Iraq note that a special relationship developed between George Bush and Tony Blair. Some have argued that Bush persuaded Blair to support the American Iraq policies. A meeting between the two leaders in 2002 has been designated as the moment in which Bush made it clear to Blair that this was something he strongly believed in. Blair, reportedly realizing that Bush would go on with his plans either way, was persuaded to support the Iraq policies of the United States (Marsh, 2003; 64; Gardner, 2005: 44; Dumbrell 2004; Coates and Krieger, 2004). This possible explanation has the underlying premise that leaders matter, and that the leadership of Blair specifically mattered in Great Britain's decision to join the Iraq War.

This thesis starts and finishes with this premise that individuals can and do matter in the making of policies. This study finds strong evidence supporting the point that leaders do matter in the making of policy. Blair argued all along that for him the world changed after 9/11 and that the challenges of this new world needed to be actively addressed. This study finds that Blair considered Saddam Hussein and Iraq a threat to British national security and to the security of the West, but that he preferred a multilateral approach to dealing with this problem. By supporting the U.S. Blair believed that he had the chance to impact policies, to thwart the U.S. from going in alone, and to convince other world leaders of the necessity to take action against Saddam Hussein.

To explain Blair's policies, this study focuses on the role of Tony Blair and his belief system in the policies of Great Britain vis-à-vis Iraq. When studying the formation of foreign policy and all the different factors that influence it, a leader and his belief system are a small, but important part of the puzzle. Indeed, if we understand how leaders make decisions and how their worldview affects their leadership, we can better understand and possibly predict the policies and behavior of other leaders. Moreover, by understanding better how leaders reach their decisions we, as citizens, can make a better judgment as to what leaders to elect to office.

This thesis contributes to the comparative analysis of personality based research in political science. Most approaches developed are solely tested in the American context, leaving a great potential for cases from countries with different political systems. Tony Blair, as a leader in Europe and a world leader makes an interesting case for the study of the role of belief systems on policies. Moreover, this thesis contributes to the growing body of literature on beliefs, belief systems, and leadership. Using both

quantitative and qualitative methods to study leadership allows for stronger conclusions both on the role of leaders and their beliefs and on the potential that quantitative analysis, like the one used here, can hold for other research.

Research Questions

The issue that this project looks into is the explanation for Great Britain joining the U.S. in the Iraq War. As mentioned above, the focus will be on the role of Blair.

Specific questions that will be answered are:

Q1: What is the role of the special relationship between the U.S. and Great Britain for the latter's decision to partake in the Iraq War? Was this relationship a necessary and sufficient condition for Great Britain to join the Iraq War?

Q2: What was the role of Tony Blair's belief system in explaining how Great Britain dealt with Saddam Hussein and its foreign policy choices regarding the decision to join the Iraq War?

Q3: Can the actions of Great Britain, when supporting the U.S. in the Iraq War, be characterized as a break with Tony Blair's previous emphasis on multilateralism to deal with international affairs?

The Hypotheses flow from these questions:

H1: The special relationship between the U.S. and Great Britain illustrates the similar world view on both sides of the ocean and thereby a similar interpretation

of world events as touching upon the national interest of both nations. This is, however, not sufficient to explain Great Britain's actions in the Iraq War.

H2: Blair's belief system is an important factor in explaining how Great Britain deals with Saddam Hussein and its foreign policy choices regarding the decision to go war with Iraq.

H3: An interpretation of Tony Blair's Operational Code (Op-Code) in conjunction with the qualitative information available suggest that Tony Blair's policy decisions vis-à-vis U.S. and Iraq were inspired by a multilateralist outlook, only to see the final goal of a multilateral approach to Iraq fail.

In order to answer these questions Chapter one begins with an inquiry in the relationship between Great Britain and the United States. Indeed, if we want to refute the thesis that Blair supported the U.S. solely because of the historical ties between the two nations those historical ties need to be addressed, as well as the role of Blair and his managing of the relationship with the United States. Subsequently, Chapter two discusses the role of leaders and their beliefs; specifically under what conditions a leader can and cannot play an important role in the formation of policies. Only if those kind of conditions were present during Blair's tenure can we consider his role as a leader in the Iraq policies. This chapter also addresses the kind of methodology used to measure a leader's belief system. The choice of Profiler Plus and Operational Code (Op-Code) is explained, as well as the advantages and drawbacks of such an approach. Chapter three follows with the results of the quantitative analysis of Blair's speeches, Blair's Op-Code is presented,

as well as an interpretation of its meaning. Taken in total, measuring Tony Blair's belief system offers us an interesting way to look at the event leading up to the Iraq War.

However, before we can turn to Blair and his belief system we have to study the broader historical context in which he was operating. The transatlantic alliance is an important aspect of British foreign policy and formed the backdrop for the decisions taken vis-à-vis Iraq. The next chapter discusses the historical transatlantic relationship in which Tony Blair operated.

CHAPTER ONE: UNDERSTANDING THE TRANSATLANTIC ALLIANCE

From Winston Churchill to Tony Blair leaders have acknowledged the existence of a special relationship between the U.S. and Great Britain. Although they acknowledge there is a special relationship, its purpose is a point of debate among scholars. This chapter will explain the debate on the special relationship in order to illustrate the context in which Blair operated when he decided to support American actions in Iraq.

Over the past century, the Anglo-American Special Relationship (AASR) has been one of the most important features of international relations and of British and U.S. foreign policies (Marsh, 2003: 56). Few scholars have challenged the existence and persistence of the AASR. However, there is no agreement on what the AASR exactly is, how 'special' it is, and who benefits from it in what way.

Strangely enough, few authors define what the AASR exactly is.¹ Instead the authors assume that the reader knows what it means. Different authors conceptualize the AASR in different manners, albeit implicitly. I will offer a definition that will be used in this thesis. But first the different approaches to the AASR have to be addressed, so that the choices made when setting up a definition will clear.

Even though most scholars are not explicit in the kind of approach they take when studying the AASR, for the ones that do, the labels they put on their approaches can be telling. Just as 'realism' sounds like a more solid approach than 'idealism', also on this topic the choice of words goes further than semantics. In the case of the AASR, whether

¹ With the exception of Warren Kimball (2005), who criticizes other scholars for their lack of definitions on this topic and he makes a fair attempt to offer a comprehensive definition.

an approach is called ‘sentimentalism’ or ‘cultural-historical’ indicates a value judgment, thereby blurring the analysis. This thesis makes the attempt to use terms that are as neutral as possible, reflecting the type of approach rather than the perceived validity of that approach. The approach this thesis refers to as ‘functionalist’ is sometimes referred to as ‘realist’, the approach called here ‘cultural-historical’ is often referred to as ‘emotional’, ‘ideological’ or ‘sentimentalist’ (Élie, 2005; Dumbrell, 2004; Kimball, 2005a, 2005b).

The Cultural-historical Approach

The British and American peoples come together naturally, and without the need of policy and design. [...] They can hardly help agreeing on three out of four things. They look at things the same way.

Winston S. Churchill, 7 Nov. 1945

Winston Churchill used the expression ‘special relationship’ for the first time publicly in his ‘Iron Curtain’ speech in March 1946 and the cultural-historical approach is based on a “Churchillian vision of Anglo-America” (Élie, 2005: 65). Shared values have long been a critical binding agent in the Anglo-American relationship (Marsh, 2003: 65-66). The AASR then is the result of a common language, a common cultural heritage, common institutions, political traditions as well as sentimental attachments and affinities (Élie, 2005: 65; Dumbrell, 2004; Kimball, 2005a; Marsh, 2003)

According to this approach, an Anglo-American culture rooted in shared language and history does exist. It operates at both elite political and diplomatic levels on the one hand, and at the level of popular culture at the other. An Atlanticist, Anglophile diplomatic elite, sustained by memories of World War II and by academic and elite social

contacts with Britain was an identifiable force in the Washington of the later 20th century. By the start of the 21st century this elite appeared to be declining in significance.

Although a rhetorical cult of respect for the example of Winston Churchill certainly developed within the Bush administration, British elite attitudes by the early years of the new century seemed to be separating out into ‘transatlantic’ and ‘Europeanist’ wings. At the mass level, younger respondents tend to evince a marked degree both of hostility to President Bush and of warmth towards American cultural production (Dumbrell, 443-444).

Warren Kimball argues that whatever the AASR’s very practical, concrete geopolitical benefits (real or imagined) to the two nations, the AASR is at its heart an *inclination*. Ideology, values, and a two centuries old special relationship have *inclined* the two nations toward each other. It is remarkable how routinely British and American leaders have found that their nations’ self-interests were parallel, if not identical. According to Kimball, this is not sentimentalism or a fit of nostalgia; it is a historical pattern, perhaps even a habit that has lasted over two hundred years (Kimball, 2005a, 2005b).

Following this approach, a definition of the AASR would be ‘an inclination of the two nations towards each other’, or a cultural-historical background or basis of trust on which Great Britain and the U.S. can build current policies. However, other scholars argue that cultural closeness is maybe one factor in the persistence of Anglo-American special relations; it is not sufficiently robust and reliable to explain the transformed survival of the AASR (Dumbrell, 2004: 444). So even scholars that take the cultural-

historical approach do recognize the importance of shared goals and interests for continued cooperation.

Following the classic International Relations (IR) theory of realism, the history and cultural closeness of two countries is not a basis for any kind of policy. Taking this as a starting point for their analysis, scholars following the functionalist approach consider the AASR to be something completely different from the cultural-historical approach.

The Functionalist Approach

The functionalist approach emphasizes the idea of the utility of the relationship between the U.S. and Great Britain. According to this reasoning, the Anglo-American Special Relationship (AASR) materialized with the military and diplomatic cooperation during WWII and the AASR was reinforced with the advent of the Cold War. The AASR was and is a diplomatic and strategic tool designed to fight a common enemy (be it Nazi Germany, Communist Russia or 'terrorism'). Following this line of reasoning the AASR is viewed as a classical mechanism of mutual aid, of aggregation of forces, intended to confront a common threat (Élie, 2005: 65). Hence the original AASR was created to serve mutual security interests and is based on the myriad of formal and informal channels, the ingrained traditions of close co-operation in matters such as intelligence, military affairs and nuclear issue and the repeated game-plays that have built mutual confidence over decades (Marsh, 2003: 57). The demise of the international Cold War system destroyed the old convergence of interests and hence the contemporary AASR rests on an updated and reshaped chain of interests (Dumbrell, 2004: 444).

Following this approach, the AASR would be defined primarily in security and military terms. Both countries share goals and interests and cooperation benefits both parties. A strict functionalist approach makes the AASR less resilient to change, since a change in international context could entail a divergence in interests and goals on both sides of the Atlantic and thereby a disintegration of the AASR.

However, the AASR has proven to be very persistent, even in times when the interests of the U.S. and Great Britain were not the same. Indeed, the alliance has always known conflicts between Great Britain and the U.S. and on occasion there have been serious differences of opinion (Williams, 2003; Dumbrell, 2004; Freedman, 2006, Élie, 2005). The persistence of the AASR through these conflicts is a sign that there is more to the AASR than a mere convergence of security and military interests.

It is important to keep in mind that neither the cultural-historical nor the functionalist approach are 'pure' approaches; each one recognized that there is a role for the premises of the other one. What seems to be the difference between the two is the emphasis on either culture and history or converging interests and goals. Indeed, does one emphasize culture, as John Dumbrell does when he states:

The AASR, defined primarily in security and military terms, has persisted. However, one possible explanation for the persistence of the AASR lies in culture. We can point to elite notions of 'Anglo-America' as a sustaining myth. Perhaps shared culture was always a more positive force, albeit one largely disregarded by those writers who tended to emphasize the 'functionalist', Cold War interests dimension of the relationship (Dumbrell, 442).

Or is the emphasis on shared interest, exemplified by the statement of Stryker McGuire:

There are strong ties: in language, history and trade; the sharing of military technology; a quarter of a million U.S. citizens live in Great Britain; there are more U.S. military in GB (11,500) than British troops in Iraq (7,500). In no way does the relationship exist more covertly and crucially than among the intelligence agencies. However, in the absence of grand causes like Iraq, Great Britain and the U.S. seem certain to drift apart, as Great Britain pursues causes that will be inimical to U.S. interest (McGuire, 2005).

This thesis recognizes the importance and validity of both approaches, with both explaining part of the puzzle. One of the assumptions behind the definition used here is that both the U.S. and Great Britain value the AASR. It takes two to tango, so both nations have to see the AASR as beneficial for their country. Historical and cultural ties and a perceived functionality of the alliance then form the basis of the definition of the AASR used in this thesis:

The historical and cultural ties between the U.S. and Great Britain incline the two nations towards each other. When the goals and interest of the two nations converge, cooperation can be beneficial for both, making the AASR expedient. Hence, the inclination towards cooperation combined with a perceived expediency of the alliance on both sides of the ocean form the basis of the AASR.

Above this project discussed the historical and cultural ties that make the AASR possible and the need for shared goals in order to cooperate under that alliance. Now we will turn to the use that the AASR has for both countries individually. The focus of ‘usefulness’ in itself exhibits a functionalist approach to the topic. However, as mentioned above, it is considered only part of the picture, strengthened by the other aspects of the AASR.

The Use of the AASR for Great Britain

The discussion on the utility of the Anglo-American Special Relationship (AASR) for both countries often focuses on Great Britain. Indeed, it is often assumed that Great Britain is the main benefactor of the alliance and that the alliance is merely ‘tolerated’ by the United States (Parmar, 2005; Andrew, 2005). However, as we will show below, this outlook is deceiving. Even though the benefits of the AASR may be more obvious for Great Britain, the U.S. also has a lot to gain from the alliance and is by no means merely tolerating it.

The AASR has always been an asymmetrical relationship. After WWII the U.S. emerged as a world power with a strong economy and military. Great Britain had endured hardships during the war and saw its empire fall apart. Part of the argument for the strength of the AASR is that the tremendous hard power of the U.S. and the lack thereof on the part of Britain –an asymmetrical power relation– is actually good for the alliance. Andrew Williams argues that only when the relationship became clearly one of subsidiary power by the global power that the U.S has become can we see the possibility of real conflict in the alliance subsiding (Williams, 2003: 233). Or as Robert Skidelsky states:

Just as important as shared values in converting allies into partners [...] is asymmetry of power. Great Britain did not really become a ‘reliable’ partner of the United States until it was no longer powerful enough to be a serious rival. To adapt Harry Dexter White's phrase, the ‘going’ powers have to be gone before they become partners in a joint enterprise (Élie, 2005: 71).

The AASR was to some degree deliberately fostered by elites in the Great Britain who saw a strong and permanent junior partnership with the U.S. as the best way to manage

British international decline (Dumbrell, 2004: 438). Some of the benefits that Great Britain derives from the contemporary AASR are influence, punching beyond the national weight, privileged access, assisted power-projection, even, however deludedly, added leverage in Europe (Dumbrell, 2004: 444; Freedman; 2006, Williams, 2003).

If the focus of the use of the AASR is on power relations, what possible gain could it bring for the United States? As the hegemonic power with a military might second to none, how could Great Britain be of use?

The Use of the AASR for the United States

In Washington, the idea of the AASR may never have been taken too seriously, with government officials emphasizing that the U.S. has ‘special relations’ with several countries (Israel is an obvious example). However, U.S. officials never actively discourage the AASR with Great Britain. If anything, in recent years the AASR has enjoyed something of a revival, with President George W. Bush apparently relieved to have at least one reliable friend (Freedman, 2006). So even though the emphasis is often of the utility of the AASR for Great Britain, there is no question that the U.S. welcomes and gains from the support of its old ally (Dumbrell, 445)

The utility of the AASR for the U.S., according to Jérôme Élie, is ‘soft power’, not ‘hard power’.² Because of the tremendous hard power of the U.S., it does not have a need for the military capabilities of Great Britain. However, “having a faithful ally has always been a source of (manufactured) legitimacy for U.S. policies on the domestic and international arena, where British support represented a benchmark as to how American

² For a discussion on soft and hard power, see: Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, *Power and Interdependence*. New York, HarperCollins, 1989.

allies *should* behave” (Élie, 2005: 72). Especially concerning U.S.-EU relations, the AASR with Great Britain is considered an important part of U.S. soft power. Washington is not unmindful of the value of British influence over the course and direction of European security and foreign policy integration. While appearances may be to the contrary, Washington does not wish continually to be perceived as acting alone (Dumbrell, 2004: 444).

Even if the aspect of soft power can be considered most central to the utility the AASR has for the U.S., some aspects of hard power should not be discarded. Indeed, Great Britain commands certain assets that hold leverage on the international stage:

A UN Security Council permanent membership; an important role in NATO; a geostrategic location in Europe and the capacity to act as an agent for U.S. interests in the European integration process; military, intelligence and diplomatic capabilities and expertise; etc. (Élie, 2005: 77).

In contemporary conditions, British military, diplomatic and intelligence assets are of some value, even if the air bases of Great Britain clearly do not command their Cold War importance. Despite its technological might, the U.S. Army, in terms of personnel, is stretched pretty thin and hence the support of British troops becomes important, even if not essential. These are elements of hard power that indicate that Great Britain is more than an ally needed for mere symbolic support. Also important is the consideration that, in order to sustain its end of the special relationship, Washington really does not have to do or commit a great deal (Dumbrell, 2004: 445).

The scholarly discussion on the AASR often lacks an explicit philosophical outlook. Scholars emphasize the importance of one aspect over the other, possibly not realizing the kind of assumptions and premises underlying their analysis. Evaluating the

AASR evolves around a matter of emphasis: high utility with a bit of cultural and historical input, or a historical and cultural basis that is strengthened by the expediency of the relationship. These choices have a tremendous impact on how the matter is discussed, not in the least regarding the kind of definitions used (implicit or explicit). This discussion has endeavored to show the validity of both approaches with the attempt to provide a viable definition taking in account aspects of both.

Relations between close allies in times of crisis are likely to be more nuanced and complex than surface impressions suggest, and that facile assumptions about natural attitudes in the face of conflict lack historical foundation. Much depends on circumstances and personalities, as well as the interests at stake (Freedman, 2006). The AASR has been described as extraordinarily resilient, central to the foreign policies of both the U.S. and Great Britain. Even though the relationship has endured hardships³, it always persevered.

Although Presidents and Prime Ministers come and go and the AASR seemingly endures regardless, the occupants of office can, and repeatedly have, influenced strongly the tone and warmth of Anglo-American relations (Marsh, 2003: 57). The influence of individuals on the AASR will always depend on situational factors, the international context, and the personality and leadership style of the individual. Chapter 2 discusses more in-depth the conditions under which individuals can make an impact on policies. For now it suffices to state that the role of individuals should not be underestimated. Leaders *can* influence the AASR and Tony Blair is a prime example of that (Marsh, 2003; Dumbrell, 229; McGuire, 2005:9).

³ For a more elaborate discussion on the hardships of the AASR encountered see Freedman, 2006; Kimball, Warren F. (2005). "The Special 'Anglo-American Special Relationship' a Fatter, Larger Underwater Cable." *Journal of Transatlantic Studies* 3: 1-5.; Élie (2005).

Tony Blair and the relationship with the United States

The AASR and 9/11

When Tony Blair came into office in 1997 he seemed to have found an ideological partner in the President of the U.S., Bill Clinton. The relationship between Blair and Clinton was remarkably close (Marsh, 2003: 58). Because of the election of George Bush to office followed with a victory of the Republican Party in the American Congress, the relations between Great Britain and the U.S. cooled a bit. The language and the symbolism of the Anglo-American Special Relationship (AASR) was repeated, but the AASR was mostly seen –on both sides of the ocean– as losing importance (Dumbrell, 2004; Marsh, 2003). What the advent of the Republican Party to power did do, despite Bush’s rhetorical commitment to the AASR, was to bring about greater policy differences, a style less successful in disguising Anglo-American disagreements, and a clash of values between a conservative America-first President and a multilateralist, social democrat Prime Minister (Marsh, 2003: 60).

The attacks on New York and Washington on September 11, 2001 changed all of this. Blair immediately offered British support, vowing to “stand shoulder to shoulder with our American friends in this hour of tragedy” (Marsh, 2003: 60). This message was powerfully reinforced by the Prime Minister’s presence in the gallery as Bush addressed a joint session of Congress on September 20th. Indeed, the impact of this upon American opinion received telling testimony. Bush told Congress eight days later that “America has no truer friend than Great Britain” and U.S. officials subsequently hailed it as “a major symbolic gesture to the American people that we would not be alone in the months ahead” (Marsh, 2003: 61).

Steve Marsh argues that three post-9/11 developments helped to bridge the difficulties between Bush and Blair and between their respective governments because of: 1) Blair's high profile international leadership and personal expression of stalwart support; 2) the opportunity for the Blair government to re-affirm Britain's privileged position in the inner circle of U.S. allies by showcasing some of Great Britain's assets as a 'pivotal power'; and 3) The provision of persistent and consistent support to the Bush administration (Marsh, 2003).

In the wake of 9/11 Blair jetted off to countries world-wide to try to engage, encourage, cajole and sometimes plead for leaders to join the American-led coalition against terror. He often acted as America's representative, especially in Europe (Marsh, 2003: 63, Freedman, 2006; Dumbrell). This gave Blair the opportunity to demonstrate international statesmanship and a willingness to take political risks that Bush and his administration could not take in the course of building the coalition against terror.

Moreover, 9/11 gave Blair the opportunity to demonstrate Britain's continued abilities as a global actor. It allowed him, and his government, to demonstrate Britain's ability to bring assets to bear in coalition-building not available to the United States. In addition, as with the Gulf War, the intervention in Afghanistan demonstrated that British and American armed co-ordination was easier and more effective than with any other country due to long-established habits of co-operation, integrated command structures, and access to the same real-time intelligence (Marsh, 2003: 62-63; Freedman, 2006).

Great Britain showed persistent and consistent support for a measured U.S. response. This reaffirmed Britain's credentials as America's closest ally. This was due in part to its generally steadfast support and in part to the contrast with the wavering

support of other leading nations. Moreover, it was especially significant as Blair at times maintained his government's supportive position in the face of adverse public opinion and political pressure (Marsh, 2003: 64; Dumbrell, 2004; Parmar, 2005).

So 9/11 afforded the Blair government the chance to reaffirm Britain's status as the loyal U.S. ally. Moreover, in many respects 9/11 served to re-align, at least partially, American and British interests after the period of disjunction that accompanied the end of the Clinton administration. Marsh argues that this was particularly noticeable in the coalescence of Bush and Blair in their response to international terrorism around the core of shared values that lie at the heart of the AASR and against which their well-publicized ideological and political differences waned by comparison (Marsh, 2003: 65).

So Blair supported Bush and the U.S. after 9/11, and that support was welcomed warmly. However, does that mean that Blair had an actual impact on Bush's policy preferences or the policies formulated by the United States? How can we know that Blair's support was not taken as mere valuable moral support and possibly justification for policy choices, without taking Blair's advice on policies seriously?

Influence on U.S. Foreign Policy

A concept such as 'influence on policy' is hard to measure. Where did Blair affect policies and to what extent? How would the policies have been made had Blair not been involved? Influence in the margins can nevertheless cause significant shifts in policy decisions. We keep this in mind when entangling the important decisions made in the run up to the Iraq war and looking for signs of Blair's influence.

Blair is regularly portrayed as ‘Bush’s poodle’ for, according to the charges, slavishly following reckless U.S. policies and proving unable or unwilling to use his political capital to moderate Bush’s recklessness (Gardner, 2005; Freedman, 2006; Coates and Krieger, 2004). Lloyd Gardner argues that for Blair the first commandment was to not endanger Anglo-American unity. Since the failure to go along with the Iraq invasion risked losing the U.S., Blair complacently and uncritically followed Bush (Gardner, 2005: 44). David Coates and Joel Krieger concur, seeing Blair’s (supposedly) open-ended commitment exemplified in his July 2003 promise to the U.S. Congress that “our job is to be with you” (Coates and Krieger, 2004: 9).

Although Blair was opened up to accusations of being too complacent and lacking an independent, critical course of action, the U.S. response to 9/11 helped enable his government to be involved in American thinking at an earlier stage than most countries and thereby influence American foreign policy as best possible (Marsh, 2003: 68; Freedman, 2006; Parmar, 2005). John Kampfner quoted the following as the building template advanced by David Manning, future British Ambassador to Washington and Blair’s foreign policy linkman with then U.S. National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice:

At the best of times, Britain’s influence on the U.S. is limited. But the only way to exercise that influence is by attaching ourselves firmly to them and avoiding public criticism whenever possible (2003, 117, quoted in Dumbrell, 2004: 440-441).

The policy of public support and private candor in dealing with the U.S. has become known as the Manning Doctrine (Dumbrell, 2004: 449). When evaluating the influence of Blair on U.S. foreign policy decisions in general, and in the case with Iraq in specific,

the Manning Doctrine is a helpful guideline. As the junior partner in the coalition it would be unrealistic to think both countries have an equal say in the policy decisions. Indeed, when the criteria for determining Blair's influence on U.S. policy is whether he was able to turn it a 180 degrees around, the conclusion will inevitably be that Blair had no influence on the process. However, when we keep the Manning Doctrine in mind and try to explain how Blair worked within the limitations of his position, and what kind of influence he exerted giving those limitation, a more realistic and interesting picture appears. Some of Blair's influence will have been in the margins, while at other times it is more directly visible.

Taking Manning's doctrine as our benchmark, how much influence did Blair have in affecting U.S. foreign policy under George W. Bush? The most plausible answer seems to be that he was able to strengthen those elements within the administration – decidedly *not* the neocons– who were inclined to multilateralize the war on terrorism, and who were not utterly committed to a precipitate attack on Iraq (Dumbrell, 2004: 447) Even though 9/11 did not stop the Bush administration's tendencies towards either unilateralism or 'internationalism à la carte', it did temporarily soften these dimensions of its foreign policy. The Bush administration's post-9/11 adjustment subtly shifted its international behavior in directions more conducive to the Blair government's aspirations for an engaged U.S., a U.S. with a temporarily blunted unilateralist disposition, and for a U.S. that better appreciated Britain's value as a 'pivotal power' and 'transatlantic bridge' (Marsh, 2003: 65).

We will probably never reach an agreement on how Blair's record of influence on American foreign policy concerning Iraq should be evaluated. It depends to a large

extent on your operating assumptions and expectations: Is 'influence' measured by the impact of Blair's ideas on the final policies? Or is it important to keep in mind under what kind of limitations Blair was operating, thereby recognizing that a junior partner can be expected a junior role in the decision making process? Moreover, some influence will never be measured since it was in the margins or because we do not know what would have happened if that influence had not been there.

To some, Blair's influence was slim to nil since the U.S. ended up exercising the policies they advocated from the beginning. Maybe Blair delayed some if it, but no fundamental policy changes were made. This thesis argues that Blair's influence was significant, especially considering his position as a junior partner in the alliance. The decision to take the case to the UN can be ascribed mostly to the moderating influences of Blair. Moreover, in the margins his influence was there, being the first and often only other world leader Bush consulted before taking decisions and with changes in nuance often coming from his influence.

Bush's convictions did limit Blair's options, but it by no means turned Blair into a poodle. His approach to the war on terror has been wider and in many respects more ambitious than Bush's, as it has looked well beyond the elimination of al Qaeda to the need to address the collection of problems bound up with failed states, social cleavages, and the deadly quarrels that sustain and inspire jihadist groups (Freedman, 2006).

At times Blair's influence on Bush's policies was more directly visible. Several scholars noted that a five-page memo from Blair to Bush, delivered on September 12th, had an impact on the American agenda. The memo reflected official London's anxiety about an immediate, inappropriate and indiscriminate American response (Dumbrell,

2004: 440; Riddel, 2003, 151; Daalder and Lindsay, 2003: 203). Blair's hand was widely seen in Bush's 12 September, 2002 speech, requesting UN sanction for U.S. Iraqi policy.

Shortly before the actual invasion Deputy National Security Adviser Stephen Hadley reportedly said that although the U.S. saw no need for a second UN resolution authorizing military action, it respected Blair's domestic need for one (Dumbrell, 2004: 447). Working with Secretary of State Colin Powell in August 2002, he persuaded Bush, against the wishes of Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and Vice President Dick Cheney, to take the Iraq problem to the UN Security Council to give any action more legitimacy (Freedman, 2006). According to Bob Woodward the President overruled both Cheney and Powell, neither of whom supported the case for a second resolution (2004: 296-97).

Robert Cook was Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of Great Britain from 1997 to 2001. He resigned from his post as Leader of the House of Commons and Lord President of the Council on March 17, 2003 in protest against the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Cook argues that left to himself "Bush would have gone to war in January. No, not in January, but back in September." He was prepared to extend credit to Blair "for persuading President Bush to delay the attack long enough for the UN inspectors to go in" (Cook 2003: 309, 311). Indeed, Blair played a significant role, influencing the policies vis-à-vis Iraq. This makes it pertinent to look into Blair's role as a leader and his worldview.

Tony Blair's Leadership

On a plane journey to Madrid in February 2003, he apparently replied as follows to a question about his loyalty to Bush: "It's worse than you think, I believe in it" (Kampfner 2003, 279; Woodward 2004, 337).

Stryker McGuire argues that if you look back at great British practitioners of the Anglo-American Special Relationship (AASR) few can touch Blair. Churchill's courting of Roosevelt changed history. Thatcher and Reagan had a meeting of minds at a momentous time. But Churchill despaired of winning over Roosevelt's successor, Harry Truman. And neither Churchill nor Thatcher could lay claim to building transformational relationships with presidents so vastly different as Clinton and Bush (McGuire, 2005: 9). No prime minister has crossed the Atlantic so often to re-assure American leaders of his fidelity in Iraq despite rising criticism at home (Gardner, 2005: 43). John Dumbrell adds that Blair's personal Atlanticist vision constitutes the central and necessary component of the contemporary AASR.

Elements of Blair's outlook are important for his leadership, notably his way of conceiving the role of the 'Atlantic bridge', his acceptance of the Manning Doctrine on British influence, and his repeated invocations of 9/11 as a key turning point in world history. Blair is an instinctive internationalist –even a UN idealist. Blair, an almost Hegelian reconciler of opposites, does not see UN internationalism, Europeanism and the AASR as forces pulling in opposite directions. Rather, they are reconcilable aspects of a successful, ethical and British foreign policy (Dumbrell, 446). As Tony Blair argued:

Britain should no longer be mesmerized by the choice between U.S. and Europe. It is a false choice. Instead it should be a transatlantic bridge for we are listened to more closely in Washington if we are leading in Europe. And we have more weight in Europe if we are listened to in Washington (Marsh, 2003: 68).

Hence Blair's outlook on the world, his worldview, mattered for his leadership and policy choices. Blair's support for the American policies derived from a mixture of personal conviction and rational calculation (Dumbrell, 449). Inderjeet Parmar takes the role of Blair's beliefs even further when he argues that Blair is on an imperial mission to remake the world, or at least significant parts of it, in alliance with the radical neo-conservative policies of the Bush administration (Parmar, 2005: 218). According to him, this sense of mission with its deep roots in Blair's philosophical, religious and political evolution explain the *specific* reasons for unflinching support of U.S. aggression in Iraq as opposed to the *general* traditional pro-American stances of previous postwar Labour ministers, and the long-term bureaucratic interests of the foreign office, military and intelligence establishments (Parmar, 2005: 218).

Besides Blair's personal beliefs regarding the world and how he should interact with it, the similarities in outlook between him and Bush are also important for Blair's policy outlook. Indeed, Blair and Bush share much in common in some aspects of their backgrounds and outlook. Their backgrounds are both in privileged private school education with a central role for religion. Their political-diplomatic styles also suggest some similarities –evangelical vigor, missionary zeal, and an almost Manichean division of the world into friends and enemies, good and evil (Parmar, 2005: 229). Their similar backgrounds and beliefs resulted in a similar worldview. This worldview, then, facilitated good transatlantic relations and formation of policies.

The impact of the shared values of Blair and Bush in drawing Great Britain and the U.S. together and in energizing the hitherto somewhat awkward Blair-Bush personal relationship should not be underestimated. September 11th re-emphasized Bush's own stated belief in February 2001 that what most binds Great Britain and the U.S. together is that "we have the same perception of the world and the beliefs in freedom, the belief in standing up for what is right and just" (Marsh, 2003: 66).

The historical and cultural background between Great Britain and the U.S. facilitates cooperation and allows both nations to understand the interests and goals of the other, thereby possibly leading to support each other. The similar worldviews and beliefs of Bush and Blair can play a similar role: it helps them understand where the other comes from, see eye to eye, and it opens a door to see the other's goals and interests, possibly resulting in cooperation. Of course it does not suffice for a united military action, but it creates a context that facilitates cooperation.

There are long-term strategic, economic and other interests that push Britain towards supporting the U.S. in world affairs, and policy is made not entirely by Tony Blair –there is a large state apparatus charged with that responsibility. However, Bush and Blair have come closely to form, represent and lead certain important tendencies within their respective state bureaucracies and have articulated a new vision for their countries that has mobilized the top levels of their foreign policymaking personnel and, to varying extents, important sections of public opinion (Parmar, 2005: 230). They have set the domestic and global agendas.

There is a strong relationship between the U.S. and Great Britain, finding its origins in shared history, culture, goals and interests. While this is an important aspect to

keep in mind when evaluating Great Britain's support of U.S. in the Iraq War, it is not sufficient. Leaders matter and Tony Blair did play an important role in the foreign policies of his country and in influencing the policies of George Bush. We will now look at the role of leaders and their beliefs. This should give us insight in *how* Blair mattered and how he came to the policy choices he made.

CHAPTER TWO: LEADERS AND THEIR BELIEFS

The focus of attention of this thesis is the role of the individual, thereby working from the premise that individuals, their characteristics and beliefs, matter. As the discussion in the previous chapter illustrates, leaders operate within a political and social context that determines when and how they matter. Within parliamentary systems such as Great Britain, Prime Ministers must consult with others before committing the resources of their government. Furthermore, most of the work that transpires within the government never reaches the highest echelons but instead stays within the bureaucracy to be addressed by the government's standard operating procedures. And even when an issue reaches the top, the leader's involvement may be limited because he has advisers with their own power that influence his decisions, he has other issues to deal with, is under time pressure, or he may not be interested in the specific issue (see Garrison, 2005). If individuals matter, and hence if the leader of a country matters in the making of its foreign policy, it will be under specific circumstances.

The Role of Leaders

Within foreign policy analysis many scholars have studied when leaders matter. Ole Holsti, for one, argues that the role of a leader becomes essential under one or more of the following conditions: novel situations requiring more than simply the application of existing standard operating procedures, highly uncertain situations in which the existing information may be scarce, contradictory, unreliable, or overwhelmingly

abundant, and stressful situations in which the decision maker is surprised or under emotional strain – i.e., conditions present during times of crisis (Holsti, 1977: 16-18; 1979). Other scholars conclude that these circumstances lead to a contraction of authority at the highest levels of government which increases the leader's freedom of action as it restrains the usual institutional constraints (Hermann, 1972; Lebow, 1981; 't Hart, 1990). These are opportunities for leaders to be directly involved and to show their mettle. Under these circumstances the leader's perceptions of an emerging situation shape how that problem is defined and addressed (Hermann, 1989; Stern, 2003). Thus the focus becomes the subjective perceptions of the policymakers dealing with the problem. In such a situation a leader has the chance to influence policy directly, and his personality is essential to that outcome.

A Leader's Personality

Personality is not always central to political behavior or policy outcomes. One of the reasons for this is the fact that a leader does not operate in a vacuum when taking decisions. And as mentioned above, context matters, as do other people involved in the process and other personal considerations on the part of the leader. Thus, in the making of foreign policy decisions a leader may be influenced by personal considerations, domestic political, and/or organizational interests as well as by his conception of the national interest. This complicates, of course, the possibilities of establishing causal relationships between a person and any particular decision. Therefore it is important to keep in mind that a leader's final decision will often be influenced by other variables – domestic politics, organizational considerations, the necessity for compromise, and so on.

Even if personality is not always important, Fred Greenstein argues that there are situations in which it can be essential. He points out that the likelihood of personal impact (1) increases to the degree that the environment admits of restructuring, (2) varies with the political actor's location in the environment, and (3) varies with the personal strengths and weaknesses of the actor (Greenstein, 2001; 1969).

The conditions of a crisis that Holsti offers, as mentioned above, create an environment that needs to be dealt with immediately and allows for restructuring. On the international stage the role of personality becomes more important when he is the leader of an important or powerful country. For example, leaders of countries such as the G8, Europe and Russia have much more leverage and power in international affairs than the leaders of Mozambique or Bolivia. And not only a leader's position on the international stage is important for the impact his personality can make on policies, it also matters what kind of policies he is dealing with. For example, American presidents exert far weaker influence upon domestic policy than on foreign policy, since Congress, the courts, interest groups and many other actors play substantial roles in determining domestic policy outcomes (see Burke, 1992; Cronin, 1980; Light, 1982; Neustadt, 1990). So under the right conditions –a flexible environment, the right position of the leader in that environment and capabilities of the leader– a leader and his personality can make a difference in the formation of policies.

The next step in the puzzle is to find out *how* personality can make a difference. James Barber employs psychobiographies in *The Presidential Character* (1972) to explain the personalities, styles, and character of modern presidents. He points out that there are three components of presidential personality –character, style and worldview–

and that they are patterned, fitting together in a “dynamic package understandable in psychological terms” (Barber, 1972: 6). *Character* is seen as the way in which a president orients toward life and his own merits (i.e., his sense of self-esteem and the criteria by which he judges himself, such as by achievement or affection). *Style* reflects the habitual way a president performs his three political roles (rhetoric, personal relations, and homework); and *worldview* consists of the leader’s primary, politically relevant beliefs regarding such things as social causality, human nature, and the central moral conflicts of the time (Barber, 1972. See also Pfiffner, 2004; Hargrove, 2004). Each of these three components of personality are highly fascinating and worthy of research for their impact on foreign policy decisions.⁴

This discussion shows the type of choices a researcher needs to make to be able to study the role of leaders: there are conditions that need to be met in the context in which the leader acts; in that context, the leader needs to be interested in the issue and be in a position from which he can influence policies; and when those factors are present, there is a choice to focus on either character, worldview or style. This thesis will focus on the last component Barber points out as central to a leader’s personality: his worldview. And the building blocks of a person’s worldview are his beliefs.

Beliefs – The Building blocks of a Worldview

As Julie Kaarbo argues, one of the strongest contributions of the literature in explaining foreign policy choices has been understanding how “leaders’ beliefs about their environment and the cognitive processes that affect how new information is

⁴ These topics have been studied extensively by scholars such as Margaret Hermann, Thomas Preston, Julie Kaarbo and others.

processed and incorporated into existing beliefs systems provide important explanations for foreign policy choices” (Kaarbo, 2003: 161). Beliefs shape problem definition and policy alternatives in the associations they create between an object and its attributes (George, 1979; Eagly and Chaiken, 1998). As such, a belief system represents a set of interrelated and interdependent beliefs that are clustered together. These beliefs help one interpret incoming information, shape how one perceives the world, and what judgments and choices are likely (George, 101).

Operational code (Op-Code) analyses are a means to ascertain the overall belief system of leaders about the world (George 1969, 1978; Holsti, 1977; Walker, 1983; Walker, Schafer, and Young, 1998). Op-Code belief systems of leaders are generated by the answers to ten specific questions regarding their philosophical and instrumental beliefs as illustrated in Table 1 (George, 1979: 100).

Table 1. Operational Code Philosophical and Instrumental Beliefs of Leaders

<i>Philosophical Beliefs</i>	<i>Instrumental Beliefs</i>
The fundamental nature of politics and political conflict, and the image of the opponent	The best approach for selecting goals for political action
The general prospects for achieving one’s fundamental political values	How such goals and objectives can be pursued most effectively
The extent to which political outcomes are predictable	The best approach to calculation, control, and acceptance of the risks of political action
The extent to which political leaders can influence historical developments and control outcomes	The matter of timing action
The role of chance	The utility and role of different means for advancing one’s interests

The Op-Code links motivation (a personality factor) with beliefs and is unique to each individual. Op-Codes can be defined as “constructs representing the overall belief systems of leaders about the world –i.e., how it works, what it is like, what kinds of actions are most likely to be successful, etc” (Cottam, et. al, 2004: 31). Beliefs serve as both information-processing filters and motivating forces for action. Unlike attitudes, they represent central beliefs, which “are concerned with fundamental, unchanging issue of politics and political action” (George, 1979: 99). By understanding the operational codes of leaders a better understanding is gained of their likely decision-making styles and political behavior.

Alexander George argues that a person’s image of the opponent (an aspect of the first philosophical belief, listed in Table 1) is particularly important in shaping his definition of the situation, especially for his assessment of the threat posed by the adversary’s behavior (George, 1969:102). For example, work on the image of the enemy during the Cold War focused on perceptions of the Soviet Union associated with an intensely felt threat. In this genre the enemy is perceived to be strong, capable of threatening ones well-being which makes the conflict zero-sum; making aggressive defense (containment) the logical policy choice (Herrmann, 1988). Both affect and emotion intensified the threat perceptions of the Soviet Union and motivated a more aggressive response to the Soviet threat (Cottam and Cottam, 2001). In their text, Martha Cottam, Beth Dietz-Uhler, Elena Mastors and Thomas Preston (2004: 51-56) discuss a series of images like the enemy image that shape problem definitions and a state’s behavior patterns. Similarly Yuen Foong Khong (1992) uses the Vietnam crisis of 1965 to show how historical analogies or stereotypes about the past shaped President Lyndon

Johnson predispositions regarding Vietnam. These types of images are strong and persistent, resilient to change. Discrepant information that challenges the existing image of the opponent as fundamentally hostile is likely to be discounted or ignored (Holsti, 1967).

These examples show how beliefs help a leader interpret the information he receives. Beliefs can also introduce choice propensities into this information processing. For example, choice can be affected by the second philosophical belief: If a leader is essentially optimistic about his ability to achieve his fundamental political values, he is likely to avoid knowingly choosing high-risk options (George: 103). Evaluation of options can also be influenced by the third philosophical belief: If one believes that the political future is predictable, one is more likely to engage in extensive analysis of the possible consequences of different policy options (Id.).

The argument here is not that a leader's Op-Code is the sole determinant of his policy choices. Indeed, as mentioned above, there are other factors (found in i.e. context or personality) that are important to take into account when evaluating a leader's actions. However, a leader's Op-Code offers us two types of propensities into the leader's decision-making: (1) *diagnostic propensities*, which extend or restrict the scope of search and evaluation and influence the leader's diagnosis of the situation in certain directions; and (2) *choice propensities* which lead the leader to favor certain types of action alternatives over others (George: 103). The beliefs of the Op-Code then play the role of general guidelines in decision-making process of a leader. This brings us to the methodology chosen for the study of Blair's belief system.

Methods to Measure a Leader's Beliefs

Research into a leader's belief system is fraught with difficulties, and questions of validity and reliability instantly come to the fore. How can something like a belief system be measured, and will it be repeatable by other researchers? Since we cannot sit down with world leaders, asking them how and why they chose specific policies, or ask them to undergo a series of psychological tests seeking the inner motivations behind their actions, we have to find a different way to study the beliefs of leaders.

This study took a two-pronged approach to the study of Tony Blair's belief system: a qualitative and a quantitative one. The qualitative component, discussed previously, consisted of three parts: 1) Chapter one discussed the Anglo-American Special Relationship (AASR), which is the context for Tony Blair's decision making; 2) A study into the role of beliefs, belief systems and leaders in the foreign policies, and the conditions under which a leader may affect the outcome of policies in Chapter two; and 3) A look into Tony Blair's role as a leader and the insights of scholars on his leadership and belief system. This qualitative component to the project will help with the interpretation of the qualitative data and enhances the validity of the research.

The second part of the study consisted of a qualitative research into Tony Blair's belief system. One approach that has proven insightful for such research is the analysis of a leader's statements. Speeches, interviews, and transcripts of parliamentary/legislative hearings are often readily available and with the help of a computer large quantities of these documents can be analyzed. The subject will not get tired, irritated, or make mistakes, another scholar can take the same data and repeat the study, the computer will be consistent in its analysis (assuring greater reliability of the

study), and with an abundance of data available comparative studies can be done that would be impossible without the use of a computer.

Operational Code as a Tool to Understand Beliefs

Operational Code (Op-Code) analysis emerged as a leadership assessment tool after World War II in response to the puzzle of Soviet negotiating behavior and the escalation of U.S.-Soviet relations into the cold war. The studies by Nathan Leites (1951, 1953) identified the Op-Code of the Soviet Politburo as the beliefs about the exercise of political power in the Bolshevik ideology, which reflected motivational biases in Lenin's character and Russian political culture. He argued that these beliefs accounted for Soviet negotiating strategy and tactics in dealing with the West at the end of World War II over such issues as German reunification, economic recovery in Europe, and a general peace settlement with Germany, Italy, and Japan (Leites, 1951, 1953; Walker, Schafer and Young, 2006: 215).

Op-Code analysis is an approach to the study of political leaders that may focus narrowly on a set of political beliefs or more broadly on a set of beliefs embedded in the personality of a leader or originating from the cultural characteristics of a society. Leites (1953) employed the broader view of Op-Code analysis that incorporated cognition, character, and culture, but his approach was modified in later applications. George (1969) argued that a leader's Op-Code should be identified simply as a political beliefs system in which some elements (philosophical beliefs) guide a leader's diagnosis of the context for action and others (instrumental beliefs) prescribe the most effective strategy and tactics in achieving goals (George, 1969; Walker, Schafer and Young, 2006: 216).

Ole Holsti (1977) continued this type of ‘analysis-at-a-distance’ research manually, without the use of a computer. He coded verbs and nouns in texts to distil the leader’s beliefs on the source of conflicts. The coding provides answers to the questions provided above, in Table 1, reflecting the philosophical and instrumental elements designated by George almost a decade earlier. Holsti made a distinction between individual, sociological, and systemic sources of conflicts, which all could be temporary or permanent. An essential part of this approach is a person’s image of the Self (e.g. Blair, or Great Britain) and the Other (e.g. Saddam Hussein, Iraq, the War on Terror and so on). The coding of the verbs and nouns gave values on both philosophical (P) and instrumental (I) indexes, i.e., the general orientation toward the world and the means by which one would influence it (for the calculation of the P- and I-indices see Appendix I). These values on the Ps and Is form the building blocks of a leader’s Op-Code (George, 1969, 1979; Holsti, 1977), as listed in Table 2 below.

Table 2. The meaning of the P- and I-indices

Index	Indication of	Type of propensity
P-1	The nature of the political universe: friendly, mixed, hostile	Diagnostic Propensities
P-2	Prospects for realizing fundamental values: optimism versus pessimism	Diagnostic Propensities
P-3	The predictability of the political universe: low to high	Diagnostic Propensities
P-4	Control over historical development: low to high	Diagnostic Propensities
	P-4a Locus of control Self	
	P-4b Locus of control Other	
P-5	The role of chance: low to high	Diagnostic Propensities
I-1	The direction of strategy: cooperative, mixed, conflictual	Choice propensities
I-2	The intensity of tactics.	Choice propensities
I-3	Risk orientation: averse to acceptant	Shift Propensities
I-4	Importance of timing of actions: low to high flexibility	Shift Propensities
	I-4a Timing of cooperation and conflict	
	I-4b Timing of words and deeds	
I-5	Utility of means: low to high	Choice propensities
	[REW] Reward	
	[PRO] Promise	
	[APP] Appeal/Support	
	[OPP] Oppose/Resist	
	[THR] Threaten	
[PUN] Punish		

(Source: Schafer, Walker and Young, 2006: Chapter 2; Walker and Schafer, 2000; George, 1979)

Values on the different indices give an indication of a leader's diagnostic propensities (the Ps), choice propensities (I-1, I-2 and I-5) and Shift propensities (I-3 and I-4). These propensities allow for predictions regarding a leader's preferred behavior and thereby allows for predictions. This predictive component holds great potential for the study of policymakers all over the world, allowing us to study and anticipate their behavior. An Op-Code is an indication of a leader's belief system, which we can define as "a configuration of ideas and attitudes in which the elements are bound together by

some form of constraint or functional interdependence” (Walker, Schafer, and Young, 1998:176).

Both George and Holsti were guided in their thinking by cognitive consistency theory, which assumed that a leader’s Op-Code beliefs were internally consistent with one another and that a leader’s decisions were consistent with these beliefs. Specifically, they argued that a leader’s philosophical beliefs about the nature of the political universe acted as a ‘master belief,’ which influenced the contents of the remaining philosophical and instrumental beliefs (George, 1969;1979; Holsti, 1976, 1977; Walker, Schafer, and Young, 1998:217).

Op-Code has since been used extensively to study the role of leaders: Stephen Walker used this approach to study Henry Kissinger’s role in the Vietnam War (1977); Stephen Walker, Mark Schafer and Michael Young studied Jimmy Carter’s Op-Code (1998); Schafer and Walker used it to test the democratic peace theory comparing Tony Blair and Bill Clinton (2006); Huiyun Feng studied Mao Zedong using this method (2005) and Mark Schafer, Sam Robison and Bradley Aldrich used Op-Code to study the 1916 Easter Rising in Ireland (2006). The work of these different scholars shows how Op-Code holds great potential for the application to different leaders, contexts and historical times.

For this thesis speeches of Tony Blair to the Parliament have been coded using the computer program Profiler Plus to create Blair’s Op-Code. Profiler uses the ‘Verbs in Context System’ (VICS) to analyze the speeches. The VICS method of content analysis is a set of techniques for retrieving belief patterns from a leader’s public statements and drawing inferences about public behavior that are compatible with these beliefs (Walker,

Schafer, and Young, 1998, 1999, 2006). To the extent that a particular leader is in control of the state's behavior or to the extent that a leader's beliefs are shaded by those individuals with the power to act on behalf of the state, these inferences become predictions about a state's behavior. For the steps VICS uses to analyze speeches, see Appendix II.

This study codes sixty-four speeches given by Tony Blair before the House of Commons. This reflects all of the speeches he gave in which Iraq, Saddam Hussein and Terrorism in relation to Iraq and Hussein are discussed and include the Q&A. There are two components to the coding of speeches: (1) A coding of all the sixty-four speeches from the start of Blair's tenure as Prime Minister in 1997 up to now. This provides us with a 'general Op-Code' of Blair, of which the I- and P-values can be interpreted, giving us an indication as to Blair's overall propensities. The values of this general Op-Code can then be compared to the second component of this quantitative research: the 'Sub Op-Codes.' (2) The timeline 1997-current have been divided in different periods with as breaking points events relating to foreign policy that could have had an impact on Blair's belief system. This subdivision of the time of Blair's tenure by breaking points gives us several Sub Op-Codes.⁵ If there is a significant difference between one Sub Op-Code to the next we can assume that difference is caused by the event between the two Sub Op-Codes. Differences or similarities in these Op-Codes can give us insight in the impact that events may have had on Blair's belief system –or the rigidity of his belief system.

The breaking points between the different Sub Op-Codes reflect events that were important for Blair's foreign policy in general, and his Iraq policies specifically. The

⁵ Sub Op-Code #1 consists of four speeches; Sub Op-Code #2 of six; Sub Op-Code #3 of 14, Sub Op-Code #4 of 11; Sub Op-Code #5 22; and Sub Op-Code #6 of seven.

breaking points were few, since Op-Code needs a significant amount of speeches to be valid, and since a person's belief system, due to the inherent rigidity of the concept, will not change dramatically over short periods of time.⁶ The five selected breaking points are listed in Table 3.

Table 3. Breaking points for Tony Blair's Op-Code 1997-current

<p><i>September 11, 2001 – The attacks on New York and Washington</i> The 9/11 terrorist attacks did not only shock the U.S. but the entire world. Blair instantly vouched support for the U.S. and pledged to help find the perpetrators. This date can be considered the start of the 'War or Terror.'</p>
<p><i>April 6, 2002 – A meeting between Blair and Bush in Texas</i> Several authors note that Blair swung around behind Bush's belligerent rhetoric vis-à-vis Iraq after a meeting in Crawford, Texas. At this meeting, Bush made clear to Blair that his determination to remove Saddam Hussein from power was immutable (Marsh, 2003; 64; Gardner, 2005: 44; Dumbrell 2004; Coates and Krieger, 2004)</p>
<p><i>May 1, 2003 – The 'End of Major Combat' of the Iraq War</i> After the Iraq War started on March 20th, Bush declared 'the end of major combat.' The swift invasion of Iraq and taking control of Baghdad could be considered a military success.</p>
<p><i>December 13, 2003 – The capture of Saddam Hussein</i> This was considered a hallmark of the military success of the Iraq invasion.</p>
<p><i>July 7, 2005 – The London bombings</i> For the first time 'Islamic Terrorism' touched Great Britain on its own soil.⁷ Great Britain became a target mainly because of its role in the Iraq War.</p>

Figure 1 represents the resulting six Sub Op-Codes with their breaking points.

Figure 1. The Sub Op-Codes with their breaking points

Sub Op-Code #1	Sub Op-Code #2	Sub Op-Code #3	Sub Op-Code #4	Sub Op-Code #5	Sub Op-Code #6
↑	↑	↑	↑	↑	↑
09/11/01	04/06/02	05/01/03	12/13/03	07/07/05	

⁶ To be able to make reliable statements on a possible change of belief system a significant amount of speeches need to be available. Due to the nature of this research some of the breaking points originally selected had to be taken out. This was the case for June 11, 1999, the end of the Kosovo bombing campaign, and January 30, 2005 the nationwide elections in Iraq.

⁷ Great Britain was already familiar with other types of terrorism due to the situation in North Ireland.

This project gives us an indication of Blair's belief system and how specific events may have affected it. The results of this qualitative research will be compared and contrasted with a quantitative research. Indeed, cross referencing the results of the qualitative research will not only help interpret the Op-Code of Blair, it will also enhance the validity of the research.

As the casual observer can note there were many potential factors influencing the British decision to go to war: supporting the transatlantic alliance, geostrategic interests, fighting terrorism, etc. And as noted before, if a leader makes a difference in the formation of policies, it is only under specific circumstances. However, since the War in Iraq holds all the conditions under which a leader matters (see discussion on leadership above) a further look into Blair's belief system is warranted. The use of a general Op-Code and Sub Op-Codes is an interesting method to look at a leader's belief system and gives us a chance to answer the questions posed at the beginning of this thesis (For further literature on Op-Code see: George, 1969, 1979; Holsti, 1977; Leites, 1953; Schafer and Walker, 2006; Walker, 1977, 1983; Walker, Schafer and Young, 1998, 2006).

CHAPTER THREE: TONY BLAIR'S OPERATIONAL CODE

The total amount of speeches by Tony Blair in which he discussed Saddam Hussein, Iraq or the War on Terror (related to Hussein or Iraq) was sixty-four. By selecting the speeches in this way the computer program knows that the 'Other' that Blair talks about is Hussein, Iraq etc. The speeches were edited so that no text of other speakers would be included.⁸ Then the computer program Profiler Plus was programmed with a list of terms indicating the 'Self' (Tony Blair, Great Britain, our country etc.). In this way Profiler Plus has an 'Other' and a 'Self', essential to construct an Op-Code. Profiler Plus analyzed the speeches several times: once as a whole body in order to construct a General Op-Code and then once for each different Sub Op-Code. Hence the total Op-Codes is seven: one general and six sub Op-Codes. The results are listed in Table. 4. It is important to keep in mind that the term 'General Op-Code' refers to the total Op-Code of Tony Blair when discussing Hussein, Iraq etc. It does not entail an Op-Code applicable to all countries, topics or situations but applies to this specific case.⁹

⁸ This is especially important in this case since the British Prime minister answers questions of the British Parliament every Wednesday. The questions and responses of the British representatives had to be edited out to avoid a muddling of the data.

⁹ It would be interesting to construct a truly general Op-Code by using all speeches of Blair in which he discusses foreign affairs. In that case the 'Self' would remain the same, but the 'Other' would apply to anything outside of Great Britain. This would allow for a broader application of the Op-Code and it could be compared and contrasted to more specific ones, like the one used in this study. However, the scope of this project did not allow for the construction of such a truly general Op-Code.

Table 4. The Op-Code Results

Index	General Op-Code	Sub Op-Code #1	Sub Op-Code #2	Sub Op-Code #3	Sub Op-Code #4	Sub Op-Code #5	Sub Op-Code #6
P-1	0.28	0.08	0.19	0.29	0.35	0.32	0.52
P-2	0.11	-0.06	0.06	0.14	0.14	0.17	0.22
P-3	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.07	0.08	0.08	0.14
P-4a	0.26	0.18	0.23	0.24	0.33	0.31	0.32
P-4b	0.74	0.81	0.77	0.76	0.67	0.69	0.68
P-5	0.979	0.985	0.981	0.983	0.973	0.975	0.955
I-1	0.65	0.20	0.64	0.62	0.71	0.80	0.78
I-2	0.30	0.07	0.33	0.27	0.31	0.39	0.39
I-3	0.25	0.08	0.16	0.25	0.29	0.36	0.31
I-4a	0.35	0.80	0.36	0.38	0.29	0.20	0.22
I-4b	0.45	0.67	0.60	0.45	0.48	0.41	0.25
I-5 [REW]	0.16	0.18	0.21	0.15	0.15	0.18	0.13
[PRO]	0.10	0.04	0.14	0.08	0.10	0.07	0.15
[APP]	0.57	0.38	0.47	0.58	0.60	0.65	0.62
[OPP]	0.08	0.18	0.08	0.10	0.03	0.07	0.09
[THR]	0.02	0.07	0.01	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.02
[PUN]	0.07	0.16	0.09	0.08	0.09	0.02	0.00

- P-4: Control over historical development; locus of control P-4a: Self, P-4b: Other
- I-4a: Timing of cooperation and conflict
- I-4b: Timing of words and deeds
- I-5 REW: Reward, PRO: Promise, APP: Appeal/Support, OPP: Oppose/Resist, THR: Threaten, PUN: Punish

Table 2 above indicates what the values on the different indices (Is and Ps) mean, and what type of propensity the indices reflect.

The figures of the different Op-Codes will be discussed in two steps: the general Op-Code and the Sub Op-Codes. First it will be explained what the specific I- and P-values for the General Op-Code mean and how they should be read. Then relevant figures from the Sub Op-Codes will be discussed, indicating why and how those figures

are important. And finally the implications of these figures will be addressed and what they mean for the questions set at the start of the thesis that we seek to answer.

Results of the General Op-Code

What do these figures mean, and how should they be interpreted? Walker, Schafer and Young offer guidance here, used as a starting point to analyze these figures (Walker, Schafer and Young, 2003; Walker, Schafer and Young, 2006). For each index they constructed tables for interpretation (see Appendix III for specific interpretations). The results of the General Op-Code with their interpretation are listed in Table 5.

Table 5. Values of Blair's General Op-Code with interpretation

Index	Values General Op-Code	Interpretation
P-1	0.28	Somewhat friendly
P-2	0.11	Mixed optimistic
P-3	0.08	Very low
P-4a	0.26	Low/Medium
P-4b	0.74	Medium/High
P-5	0.979	Very high
I-1	0.65	Definitely cooperation
I-2	0.30	Somewhat cooperation
I-3	0.25	Low/Medium
I-4a	0.35	Low/Medium
I-4b	0.45	Medium
I-5[REW]	0.16	Medium
[PRO]	0.10	Low/Medium
[APP]	0.57	Very high
[OPP]	0.08	Low
[THR]	0.02	Very low/Low
[PUN]	0.07	Low

The P-values are the diagnostic values, indicating how Blair perceives the world and how he characterizes it. A low P-1 score (the nature of the political universe) indicates that, on average, the leader sees others as more hostile in the political universe while a high score indicates that the leaders sees others as more friendly (Walker, Schafer and Young, 2006: 33). Blair's score of 0.28 then means that he believes that the political universe is somewhat friendly, offering opportunities for cooperation. Lower I-1 scores (the direction of strategy) indicate that the subject attributes more utility to conflict of actions while higher scores indicate that a cooperative strategy is more useful (Walker, Schafer and Young, 2006: 35). Blair's scores show that he beliefs that a definitely cooperation-oriented direction is the best strategy in this universe.

The P-2 index (prospects for realizing fundamental values) ranges from pessimistic with lower scores to optimistic with higher scores (Walker, Schafer and Young, 2006: 33). Blair's score of 0.11 shows that he believes that the prospects for realizing fundamental political goals are mixed optimistic. The P-2 score can be tied to the I-2 score (the intensity of tactics), where lower scores indicate a self's belief about the utility of hostile tactics and higher scores indicate a belief in the utility of cooperative tactics. Blair believes that somewhat cooperative tactics are the best strategy in a situation where the prospects for realizing fundamental political goals are mixed (P-2).

Low P-4 scores (control over historical development) indicate that the subject sees the locus of control residing more with others while higher scores indicate that the subject sees himself as having more control (Walker, Schafer and Young, 2006: 34).

Blair's scores show that that he believes he has a fairly low degree of control over

historical developments, while a fairly high level of control is attributed to others in the political universe.

The I-5 scores consist of expressions that indicate cooperative means (Reward, Promise and Appeal/Support) and expressions that indicate conflict means (Oppose/Resist, Threaten, Punish). Blair's scores tend to be cooperative in their orientation. Specifically, the utility of Appeal is the highest (0.57), indicating that Blair believes that the most effective way to reach his goals is by appealing to other leaders. The score for Reward (0.16) show that Blair relies on it less than on Appeal, considering it moderately useful. However, Appealing and Rewarding together are the preferred strategy, being used much more often than Promise (0.10), Oppose (0.08), Punish (0.07) and Threaten (0.02). Adding up these scores Blair uses cooperative means 83% of the time and conflictual means 17% of the time; indicating a clear preference for a cooperative approach rather than a conflictual stance.

Blair has fairly low P-3/I-3 scores (the predictability of the political universe and risk orientation). Leaders with very low scores for P-3 (0.08) and fairly low scores for I-3 (0.25) attribute very low ability to predicting the future and how others will act. Interpretation of these scores is enhanced by the indices for the importance of timing (I-4) or their flexibility in shifting between different kinds of tactics as a risk management technique (Walker, Schafer and Young, 2006). If we take both sets of scores into account this suggest that Blair deals with the low predictability of the future through a relatively flexible use of cooperative and conflictual words and deeds. Finally, P-5 is an index for the role of chance in the political equation. The logic of this index is that the higher the predictability of the political future and the greater the leader's belief in his ability to

control historical development, the less the role of chance. Blair attributes a very high role to chance (Walker, Schafer and Young, 2006: 35).

From this analysis we can see that, according to Blair's view, opponents tend to respond in kind to conciliation and firmness, and multilateral approaches backed by firm resolve seem to offer a useful course of action. He considers it important to use flexible strategies that control risks by avoiding escalation and acting quickly when conciliation opportunities arise. The goal thereby is to emphasize resources that establish a climate for negotiation and compromise and avoid the early use of force (Walker, Schafer, 2006; Walker, Schafer and Young, 2006).

These factors leave Blair, in his worldview, a lot of wiggle-room. If Blair has confidence in his leadership capabilities and his diplomacy skills, he can be the vehicle to create a climate for negotiation and compromise – both with Hussein and Bush – thereby avoiding war. Moreover, his diplomatic skills might influence Bush to see the situation in a similar light, as a situation for opportunity and flexibility, and not one that automatically leads to a military solution.

In his analysis of Tony Blair's leadership traits using Margaret Hermann's leadership-trait-analysis (LTA) technique, Stephen Dyson (2005) concludes that Blair had a high belief in his ability to control events, a high need for power and low conceptual complexity which gave him a proactive policy orientation, an internal belief he could shape events, a binary information processing and framing style, and a preference to work through tightly held processes in policymaking (Dyson, 2005: 303). This may be just what motivated Blair to be so actively involved and to make the choices he did.

Results of the Sub Op-Codes

As mentioned before, people often assumed that Blair supported the Iraq War because he was convinced by Bush at a meeting in Crawford, TX on April 6, 2002. He himself has often stated that after 9/11 the world changed and that he was personally convinced that the Iraq War was needed to defend Great Britain and the West. This research allows for a testing of these different options by comparing Blair's General Op-Code to the different Sub Op-Codes. If the figures differ in a significant way before and after a point (say 9/11, or the meeting with Bush) it can be assumed that that point caused the change in worldview. On the other hand, if no significant changes can be measured before and after an event, its impact on Blair's worldview can be considered insignificant.

A point to keep in mind when discussing these figures is that a person's worldview, by nature, is rigid. Hence if an important event does not seem to affect a person's worldview it does not mean that event was not important to that person. Indeed, events can have an important impact on a leader's personal life or his position on specific policies without changing his worldview.

To study the impact of specific events on Blair's worldview the values of the Sub Op-Codes are detracted from the General Op-Code. The Standard Deviations (SD) of the different indices (the Is and the Ps) of the Sub Op-Codes are then calculated to give a measure of 'significant difference.' If the difference between the General Op-Code and the Sub Op-Code on any of the indices is more than one SD it is considered significant. If that difference is more than two SDs it is considered highly significant. Table 6 shows

these results. The bold figures indicate a difference of more than one SD; the bold and grey figures indicate a difference of more than two SDs.

Table 6. Difference between the values of the Sub Op-Codes and the values of the General Op-Code.

Index	Sub Op-Code #1	Sub Op-Code #2	Sub Op-Code #3	Sub Op-Code #4	Sub Op-Code #5	Sub Op-Code #6	Standard Deviation Sub Op-Codes	Standard Deviation x2
P-1	-0.20	-0.09	+0.01	+0.07	+0.04	+0.24	0.1363	0.2726
P-2	-0.17	-0.05	+0.03	+0.03	+0.06	+0.11	0.0903	0.1806
P-3	=	=	-0.01	=	=	+0.06	0.0234	0.0468
P-4a	-0.08	-0.03	-0.02	+0.07	+0.05	+0.06	0.0552	0.1104
P-4b	+0.07	+0.03	+0.02	-0.07	-0.05	-0.06	0.0526	0.1052
P-5	+0.006	+0.002	+0.004	-0.006	-0.004	+0.024	0.0100	0.0200
I-1	-0.45	-0.01	-0.03	+0.06	+0.15	+0.13	0.2011	0.4022
I-2	-0.23	+0.03	-0.03	+0.01	+0.09	+0.09	0.1085	0.2710
I-3	-0.17	-0.09	=	+0.04	+0.11	+0.06	0.0948	0.1896
I-4a	+0.45	+0.01	+0.03	-0.06	-0.15	-0.13	0.2011	0.4022
I-4b	+0.22	+0.15	=	+0.03	-0.04	-0.20	0.2083	0.4166
I-5 [REW]	+0.02	+0.05	-0.01	-0.01	+0.02	-0.03	0.0262	0.0524
[PRO]	-0.06	+0.04	-0.02	=	-0.03	+0.05	0.0386	0.0772
[APP]	-0.19	-0.10	+0.01	+0.03	+0.08	+0.05	0.0945	0.1890
[OPP]	+0.10	=	+0.02	-0.05	-0.01	+0.01	0.0452	0.0904
[THR]	+0.05	-0.01	=	=	-0.01	=	0.0206	0.0412
[PUN]	+0.09	+0.02	+0.01	+0.02	-0.05	-0.07	0.0522	0.1044

• **Bold figures** indicate that the difference between the values of the Sub Op-Code and those of the General Op-Code is more than one standard deviation (SD).

• **Bold and grey figures** indicate that the difference between the values of the Sub Op-Code and those of the General Op-Code is more than two SDs.

These figures offer an interesting picture. The values of Blair's beliefs before 9/11 (Sub Op-Code#1) show significant or very significant differences with the General Op-Code on most indices and Sub Op-Code #6 (after the London bombings) shows significant differences mostly on the diagnostic values, the Ps. This means that Blair's worldview

changed most profoundly on 9/11 and that it was again impacted with the London bombings.

Before 9/11

Most of the values of Blair's Sub Op-Code#1 are significant. On the diagnostic values, the Ps, lower values of P-1, P-2 and P-4 before 9/11 indicate that Blair considered the universe to be *more* hostile, that he was *more* pessimistic about his prospects to realize fundamental values, and that he was *less* confident that he could control his environment before than after 9/11. Overall Blair still considered the locus of control to be more with the other than with himself.

All the I-values are significant or very significant. The lower values of I-1, I-2 and I-3 indicate that Blair, before 9/11, was *more* likely to use conflictual strategies to reach his goals, that he believed more strongly in the use of hostile tactics and that he was *more* risk averse than after 9/11. The higher scores on the I-4 values indicate that he was more flexible with the importance of the timing of his actions than after 9/11.

And finally, the change in the I-5 values indicates differences in the way in which he beliefs he can best deal with his environment. Before 9/11 Blair was less likely to make promises and to appeal to other leaders, while his preferred more approaches of opposing, threatening or punishing. This means that Blair's language was more conflictual *before 9/11* than thereafter¹⁰.

¹⁰ It is important to keep in mind that the discussion of the I-5 values here (the use of reward, promise, appeal etc.) refers to the *relative* use of these approaches and the differences between before and after 9/11. Overall Blair's preferred approach is consistently that of appealing. However, his use of this approach was significantly less before 9/11 than after (more than two SDs).

These results are quite interesting and possibly even counter-intuitive. That 9/11 changed Blair's worldview does not need to come as a surprise, but the way in which it changed that worldview is revealing. It seems that 9/11 increased Blair's confidence to influence his environment. In that sense 9/11 functioned as a wake-up call, making it clear to Blair that the world had changed, that he had to deal with it, and that he had the abilities to deal with it. However, the way in which he believed he should deal with the new world was by diplomacy, avoiding conflictual strategies and reducing risks. His 'utility of means' scores are consistent with this picture, indicating an increase in the use of promises and appeals, avoiding more conflictual language. Hence for Blair the 'new world' after 9/11 was one that needed to be dealt with together, multilaterally.

When we compare this analysis with Blair's actions after 9/11 it seems to fit well. Blair became highly involved in diplomacy, traveling to many capitals of the world trying to convince other leaders of the position of the U.S. and Great Britain. He, more than Bush, emphasized the importance of multilateralism and diplomacy, trying to get other countries on board and attempting twice to assure that any actions taken against Iraq under the auspices of the UN. He was a true believer –as he has claimed consistently– and he believed strongly in the importance of the case and in his ability to make a difference. Eventually the Iraq War turned out to be less multilateral as Blair had hoped and the UN did not endorse the Iraq policies. Blair's outlook, however, always remained multilateral.

Great Britain ended up committed to a ‘unilateral’¹¹ action that Blair –in that form– had tried to avoid. Bush and Blair agreed on the new threat and that international action needed to be taken. They disagreed, however, on the importance of multilateral support for those actions. Blair got involved hoping, believing that he could convince other leaders of the importance of the case and thereby turning it into a multilateral effort. In that attempt, he failed.

After the London Bombings

Even though the change in worldview caused by the London bombing was not as encompassing as that of 9/11, it was however significant in the way in which Blair perceived the world. His P-values, the diagnostic values, are all significant or very significant. An interesting observation comparing Blair’s P-values before 9/11 and after the London bombings (Sub-Op Codes #1 and #6) is that all P-values after the London bombings are in the opposite direction of the significant P-values before 9/11.

Most of Blair’s P-values increased after the London bombings. The higher P-1, P-2, P-3, and P-5 values mean that Blair considered the universe to be *less* hostile, that he was *less* pessimistic about his prospects to realize fundamental values, that he saw other actors as behaving consistently and thereby being *more* predictable, and that he believed there was a *higher* role of chance in the world after the London bombings than before.

The changes in his I-values after the London bombings are few, only on some of his ‘utility of means’ indices. After the London bombings he believes that the use of

¹¹ Blair and Bush have always maintained that it was a multilateral action because there were many countries involved in the Iraq War. It was, however, often perceived as a unilateral action of the U.S. with the mere symbolic support of small nations that could not contribute significantly.

rewards and punishments are less useful, and he uses promises more often to reach his goals.¹²

These figures can be considered strange, unexpected, and definitely harder to interpret than the pre-9/11 figures. Indeed, how can an attack to Great Britain's capital make Blair see the world as *less* hostile? How can he be *more* optimistic about reaching his goals? Part of the explanation lies in how the indices are calculated: the specific formula for the P-1 index (the nature of the political universe) is the percentage of positive utterances about others minus the percentage of negative utterances about others (Walker, Schafer and Young, 2006: 33).

After the London bombings Blair, as the leader of a struck nation, had to comfort and inspire his people. His speeches, in an attempt to consolidate and calm his people, possibly trying to avoid further hostilities towards the Muslim population within Great Britain, may have been emphasizing the positive aspects of the situation more ('most Muslims in Great Britain are excellent Britons', 'Our servicemen and women are doing a great job protecting our country'). This, in turn, would be picked up by Profiler Plus, the computer program used to analyze Blair's speeches, as Blair seeing the world as less conflictual and confident about his abilities to influence events.

¹² Again, it should be kept in mind that the discussion of the I-5 values evolves around the *changes* in those values. Relatively speaking he uses rewards and punishments less, and promises more. His preferred means of reaching his goals is still, consistently, appealing to others.

Implications

The analysis of the figures after the London bombings may be less satisfying and intuitive than the analysis of the pre-9/11 figures. Especially when one puts the figures in the context of what happened before and after these two events, the figures of the London bombings remain more startling and less easy to explain than those concerning 9/11.

However, what is most striking about these figures is their consistency. Close to all indices change between before and after 9/11, and all diagnostic propensities change after the London bombings. There can be disagreement on the specific interpretation of the figures pre 9/11 and post London bombings, but the large, significant and consistent changes in Blair's figures on these Sub Op-Codes are relevant in and of themselves. This allows for fairly strong conclusions.

CONCLUSION

Why did Great Britain support U.S. policies in Iraq? Although several explanations are possible –i.e., the nature of the transatlantic relationship, because Bush convinced Blair in a meeting at his ranch in Texas, or because Blair was a ‘true believer’– this analysis argues it was because of his belief system

Great Britain did not follow the U.S. into the Middle East solely because of the Anglo-American Special Relationship (AASR). The U.S. and Great Britain have a strong relationship, finding its origins in shared history, culture, goals and interests. Although that relationship enhanced each to consider the interests and needs of the other, it is not enough to surpass their own national interests. The AASR provides a context which facilitates cooperation, but shared goals and interests are essential for that cooperation to materialize. Hence the explanation that Great Britain followed the U.S. because of the AASR is too simplistic, not taking into account other crucial factors involved. One of those crucial factors is the role of the leaders in U.S.-Great Britain relations.

A second explanation often offered is that Tony Blair followed George Bush into Iraq. On April 6, 2002, both leaders had a meeting in Texas that is often considered the moment at which Blair was persuaded to support Bush and the American policies. The data presented in this thesis (between Sub Op-Code #2 and #3) do not show any consistent signs of changes in Blair’s worldview that would support this thesis. Indeed, the figures indicate that there are no major changes around this time, refuting this claim.

The data presented are extremely consistent, thereby offering a clear picture: Blair’s worldview was changed profoundly due to 9/11, and impacted again after the

London bombings. That makes Blair a 'true believer' when it comes to the War on Terror, supporting Bush and the American policies because he believed the situation in the Middle East had to be dealt with. As explained above, there was disagreement about the necessity of multilateralism and diplomacy, but there were no fundamental disagreements on the need to deal with a changed world. Blair has always maintained that he truly believed in this cause, as he stated to a journalist in February 2003: "It's worse than you think, I believe in it" (Kampfner 2003, 279; Woodward 2004, 337).

This explanation finds support in the Butler Review¹³ that stated that Blair's policy towards Iraq shifted because of the attacks of 9/11, not because of Iraq's weapons program (Butler, 2004). The explanation that Blair's worldview changed after 9/11 and that he truly believed in the necessity and righteousness to deal with Saddam Hussein also finds support in the Hutton Inquiry.¹⁴ In the course of his investigations Lord Hutton cleared the Government of deliberately inserting false intelligence into their published dossier on Iraqi WMD, not finding any evidence that that Blair had misled the House of Commons or the public because he had believed it himself (Hutton, 2004).

In 2007, four years after the start of the Iraq War, the decisions taken back then are more controversial than ever. The fact that there were no weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) found and the evolution of the conflict into a civil war have increased criticism Bush and Blair's decision to go to war. Both the U.S. and Great Britain have installed committees to study the decisions towards the Iraq War, and both

¹³ Butler Review was published on 14 July 2004. It was an inquiry of the British Government chaired by Lord Burtler into the intelligence relating to Iraq's weapons of mass destruction which played a key part in the Government's decision to invade Iraq (as part of the U.S.-led coalition) in 2003. The inquiry also dealt with the wider issue of WMD programmes in "countries of concern" and the global trade in WMD.

¹⁴ The Hutton Inquiry reported on January 28th, 2004. It was a British judicial inquiry chaired by Lord Hutton, appointed by the United Kingdom Labour government to conduct an investigation into the circumstances surrounding the death of Dr. David Kelly on 18 July 2003.

leaders have had to justify their decisions domestically. Indeed, looking into Blair's motivations to support the Iraq policies of the U.S. is as relevant today as it was when he made that decision.

The overall point take from this analysis is that leaders do matter. The Iraq War is a good example. When leaders take decisions, their beliefs about the world and their role in it significantly shape their country's foreign policy. Looking at Blair's belief system allowed this study to explain part of the puzzle as to why Great Britain joined the U.S. in the Iraq War. While domestic politics, the transatlantic special relationship, and the manner in which the international community reacted to the events mattered, Blair's beliefs are shown to be an important tipping point in Britain's foreign policy response. The focus on belief systems explains a part of the puzzle that can not be explained in any other way. And as small a part of the puzzle beliefs explain, it happens to be the part that sometimes makes all the difference.

APPENDIX I. THE CALCULATIONS FOR THE P AND I INDICES.

PHILOSOPHICAL BELIEFS

	<u>Elements</u>	<u>Index</u> ¹⁵	<u>Interpretation</u>
P-1.	NATURE OF THE POLITICAL UNIVERSE (Image of Others)	%Positive minus %Negative Transitive Other Attributions	+1.0 friendly to -1.0 hostile
P-2.	REALIZATION OF POLITICAL VALUES (Optimism/Pessimism)	Mean Intensity of Transitive Other Attributions divided by 3	+1.0 optimistic to -1.0 pessimistic
P-3.	POLITICAL FUTURE (Predictability of Others Tactics)	1 minus Index of Qualitative Variation ¹⁶ for Other Attributions	1.0 predictable to 0.0 uncertain
P-4.	HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT (Locus of Control)	Self (P4a) or Other (P4b) Attributions ÷ [Self plus Other Attributions]	1.0 high to 0.0 low self control
P-5.	ROLE OF CHANCE (Absence of Control)	1 minus [Political Future x Historical Development Index]	1.0 high role to 0.0 low role

INSTRUMENTAL BELIEFS

	<u>Elements</u>	<u>Index</u>	<u>Interpretation</u>
I-1.	APPROACH TO GOALS (Direction of Strategy)	%Positive minus %Negative Self Attributions	+1.0 high cooperation to -1.0 high conflict
I-2.	PURSUIT OF GOALS (Intensity of Tactics)	Mean Intensity of Transitive Self Attributions divided by 3	+1.0 high cooperation to -1.0 high conflict
I-3.	RISK ORIENTATION (Predictability of Tactics)	1 minus Index of Qualitative Variation for Self Attributions	1.0 high to 0.0 low shift propensity
I-4.	TIMING OF ACTION (Flexibility of Tactics)	1 minus Absolute Value [%Xminus %Y Self Attributions]	1.0 high to 0.0 low shift propensity
I-5.	UTILITY OF MEANS (Exercise of Power)	Percentages for Exercise of Power Categories a through f	+1.0 very frequent to 0.0 infrequent
	a. Reward	a's frequency divided by total	
	b. Promise	b's frequency divided by total	
	c. Appeal/Support	c's frequency divided by total	
	d. Oppose/Resist	d's frequency divided by total	
	e. Threaten	e's frequency divided by total	
	f. Punish	f's frequency divided by total	

Source: Schafer and Walker, 2006:569; Schafer,2000: 522-523).

¹⁵ All indices vary between 0 and 1.0 except for P-1, P-2, I-1, and I-2, which vary between -1.0 and +1.0. P-2 and I-2 are divided by 3 to standardize the range (Walker, Schafer, and Young, 1999).

¹⁶ The Index of Qualitative Variation is a ratio of the number of different pairs of observations in a distribution to the maximum possible number of different pairs for a distribution with the same N (number of cases) and the same number of variable classifications (Schafer and Walker, 2006:569).

APPENDIX II. STEPS IN THE VERBS IN CONTEXT SYSTEM

1. Identify the subject as

Self or Other

2. Identify the tense of the transitive verb as

Past, Present or Future

and identify the category of the verb as

	Positive (+) or	Negative (-)
Words	Appeal, Support (+1)	Oppose, Resist (-1)
	or Promise benefits (+2)	or Threaten costs (-2)
Deeds	Rewards (+3)	Punishments (-3)

3. Identify the domain as

Domestic or Foreign

4. Identify target and place in context

An example

A quote taken from President Carter's address to the nation on January 4, 1980:

"Massive Soviet military forces have invaded the small, non-aligned, sovereign nation of Afghanistan."

1. **Subject.** The subject is "Massive Soviet military forces," which is coded as other; that is, the speaker is not referring to his or to her self or his or her state.

2. **Tense and category.** The verb phrase "have invaded" is in the past tense and is a negative deed coded, therefore, as punish.

3. **Domain.** The action involves an actor (Soviet military forces) external to the speaker's state (the United States); therefore, the domain is foreign.

4. **Target and context.** The action is directed towards Afghanistan; therefore, the target is coded as Afghanistan. In addition, we designate a context: Soviet-Afghanistan-conflict-1979-88.

The complete data line for this statement is:

Other -3 foreign past Afghanistan Soviet-Afghanistan-conflict-1979-88.

Source: Walker, Schafer and Young, 1998: 183

APPENDIX III. INTERPRETATION OF THE P-INDICES

P-1. The nature of the political universe (hostile/friendly)

HOSTILE								FRIENDLY
Extremely	Very	Definitely	Somewhat	Mixed	Somewhat	Definitely	Very	Extremely
-1.0	-.75	-.50	-.25	0.0	+.25	+.50	+.75	+1.0

P-2. Realization of political values (pessimism/optimism)

PESSIMISTIC								OPTIMISTIC
Extremely	Very	Definitely	Somewhat	Mixed	Somewhat	Definitely	Very	Extremely
-1.0	-.75	-.50	-.25	0.0	+.25	+.50	+.75	+1.0

P-3. Predictability of political future (very low/very high).

a. control of the self – b. control of the other

PREDICTABILITY			PREDICTABILITY		
Very low	Low	Medium	High	Very high	
0.0	.25	.50	.75	1.0	

P-4. Role of chance (very low/very high)

CHANCE				CHANCE
Very low	Low	Medium	High	Very high
0.0	.25	.50	.75	1.0

P-5. Utility of means

UTILITY				UTILITY
Very low	Low	Medium	High	Very high
0.0	.25	.50	.75	1.0

Adapted from Walker, Schafer and Young, 2003; Walker, Schafer and Young, 2006.

APPENDIX III. (CONT'D) INTERPRETATION OF THE I-INDICES

I-1 Direction of Strategy (conflict/cooperation)

CONFLICT						COOPERATION			
Extremely	Very	Definitely	Somewhat	Mixed	Somewhat	Definitely	Very	Extremely	
-1.0	-.75	-.50	-.25	0.0	+.25	+.50	+.75	+1.0	

I.2. Intensity of tactics (conflict/cooperation)

CONFLICT						COOPERATION			
Extremely	Very	Definitely	Somewhat	Mixed	Somewhat	Definitely	Very	Extremely	
-1.0	-.75	-.50	-.25	0.0	+.25	+.50	+.75	+1.0	

I-3. Risk orientation (very low/very high)

RISK AVERSE			RISK ACCEPTANT		
Very low	Low	Medium	High	Very high	
0.0	.25	.50	.75	1.0	

I-4. Flexibility of Tactics (very low/very high)

a. Between cooperation and conflict – b. Between words and deeds

FLEXIBILITY			FLLEXIBILITY		
Very low	Low	Medium	High	Very high	
0.0	.25	.50	.75	1.0	

I-5. Utility of means (very low/very high)

a. Cooperative means – appeal/support, promise, reward

b. Conflict means – oppose/resist, threaten, punish

UTILITY				UTILITY	
Very low	Low	Medium	High	Very high	
0.0	.25	.50	.75	1.0	

Adapted from Walker, Schafer and Young, 2003; Walker, Schafer and Young, 2006.

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